Defense Triad
Defensive Triad
Prior to his assertion of a new concept entitled the “Defensive Triad”, Richard Clarke analyses the strategy and effective of three presidential administrations in order to provide evidence of the need of more regulation for critical infrastructures within the United States. He was appointed the first Cyber Czar by President Bill Clinton and has become very familiar with his policies. While Clarke asserts that the creation of the government position was a positive move for the United States, he claims that Clinton’s policies lack teeth, particularly lacking the inclusion of policies which provide regulation for the critical infrastructures within the United States. Clarke praised President Bush for establishing the Department of Homeland Security and using Cyber Command to pursue terrorists on an international basis; however, he criticizes President Bush in much the same way as Clinton. Clarke views President Obama’s strategy as an extension of the Bush policies since there was no development of Federal regulation under his administration. Clarke’s “Defensive Triad” provides a Federal solution to the lack of regulation within the country by focusing on a few key areas of critical infrastructure: IT backbone, power grids and Defense Department’s systems.
IT Backbone
Clarke asserts that the majority of internet traffic can be traced by its transmission through the networks at several tier 1 internet service providers (ISP) within the United States. Clarke understands the security within the networks at these private companies represents a significant portion of any policy or strategy which addresses the need to protect Americans from cyberattacks and cyberwarfare. He believes that the Federal government should create policies which mandate private companies to inspect traffic as it enters the internet in order to identify malicious traffic before it can compromise any components of the ISP’s networks. Clarke suggests a deep-packet scanning method in order to accomplish the task of identifying malicious traffic before it presents itself as threat agents. Presumably, this would work similarly to protocols that inspect emails before they appear on various email programs on today’s computers.
Power Grid
Due to the interdependency between critical infrastructures within the United States, Clarke suggests that any compromising of the networks within the power grid would have a negative effect on energy and all other critical infrastructures within the country, which underscores the need to adopt Federal regulation for managing power grid. Even though Clarke’s Defensive Triad concept is a new idea he has adopted after decades of research into the protection of critical infrastructures, he does not agree that all new trends represent sound strategy for protecting CI against intrusion. For example, as SCADA controls have evolved since they were first introduced in the 1960s and now are connected to the internet, Clarke is suggesting a reversal of this trend. He wants SCADA controls to be removed from company networks and used through authentication network systems. Clarke views the power grid, and other critical infrastructures has possessing a dependency on the internet that leaves companies far too vulnerable when it comes to the protection of critical infrastructures. He also notes that many power companies contain vulnerable networks which makes it possible for threat agents to compromise SCADA controls and other aspects of company networks. For these reasons, Clarke believes that the Federal government should make it a priority to develop regulations that can help companies effectively protect their critical infrastructures from attack, especially the power grid due to its importance to the daily lives of Americans and the significant impact compromises in the system could present to the critical infrastructure. Even though prices could be significant, Clarke recommends the upgrading of systems to secure networks, isolation of SCADA and DCS systems, and the improvement of access authentication.
Defense (DOD) IT Systems
The Department of Defense uses three primary systems: NIPRNET, SIPRNET and JWICS. Each system is separated and contains complex authentication tools. Clarke makes the following recommendations to improve security at the Department of Defense: guard end points by desktop firewalls, anti-intrusion software on all computers and networks (even if they are not connected to the internet), use at least two factors of authentication, segment the networks into more subnets with limitation on cross-interaction, encrypt all data and files within every computer, increased monitoring of unauthorized access to networks and direct removal instances of unauthorized individuals or organizations having access to the network.
Perspective
I believe that adopting the Defensive Triad model could make significant improvements to networks influencing critical infrastructures within the United States. However, I would assert that it’s next to impossible for this strategy to be adopted in today’s political climate. It would be difficult for any Presidential or Congressional candidate to run on the prospect of including regulation within Federal law due to the idea that it would cost companies too much money and restrict their growth. No politician wants to be known as someone who restricts business. I do not believe this should be an all-or-nothing topic. I think that politicians and business professionals would agrees that some regulation, despite its cost, could improve the security of networks at private corporations and thereby make the technologies which manage critical infrastructures much stronger than they are today. Even though it’s unlikely to pass if this were a bill today, I agree with Clarke’s three pillars of the Defensive Triad and why they are present within his strategy. I believe that the interdependency model is one of the most important critical infrastructure models to consider when creating policy regarding national security. The power grid influences all other critical infrastructures within the United States. Therefore, any serious Federal policy would consider identifying and mandating strategies that will improve the security of the power grid’s technology. I also view regulation of the ISPs as a necessary step in cybersecurity at the Federal level; even though it would increase cost, having the extra steps of monitoring traffic before it has the opportunity to compromise a network represents sound security strategy that should be implemented at every ISP and company handling critical infrastructures within the United States. Since the Department of Defense is responsible for the nation’s cybersecurity efforts on an international scale with its Cyber Command division, it would be in the national security interest of the United States to ensure that the department is secure so that it can carry out its operations throughout any country in the world. The only flaws within adopting the policy includes the cost of implementation and a staunch political climate that is likely to resist the Defensive Triad at the Legislative and Executive levels within the United States.